TOKYO: Power in 2012 at the height of post Fukushima anti nuclear sentiment, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has promoted nuclear energy as a pillar of his economic agenda at home and abroad. Indeed, despite the industry’s diminishing domestic prospects, his return to office signals the continuation of policies promoting Japanese nuclear technology abroad as a means of addressing the nation’s trade deficit, ironically a product of the suspension of most of Japan’s own reactors.
Nuclear exports contribute significantly to the pursuit of Japan’s foreign economic and political goals in strengthening key bilateral relationships and opening up investment opportunities with emerging economies. Certain agreements, however, arguably risk implicating Tokyo in international proliferation controversies or potential future industrial-environmental disasters, while the long-term financial benefits of nuclear power investments are also uncertain.
Furthermore, some analysts contend that Japanese society’s traditional “nuclear allergy,” including its nuclear non-proliferation principles, is facing steady erosion under sustained internal and external pressures. Tokyo has been criticised for backtracking on past professions of anti-nuclear principles, considering that this year’s version of its annual UN motion advocating for the elimination of nuclear weapons critically omitted any mention of a landmark treaty concerning the banning of such capabilities. As such, the signs indicate that Japan will persist with nuclear exports despite the myriad risks to its international reputation and global security generally.
On the one hand, recent civil nuclear agreements with India and Turkey have benefited Japan’s economic interests and strengthened important bilateral relationships. Tokyo signed its first post-Fukushima export deal with Ankara in 2013, a $22 billion agreement for the construction of the latter’s second reactor complex at Sinop on the Black Sea. Turkey had specifically sought Japanese nuclear expertise because of a shared seismic vulnerability and desire to develop an indigenous energy baseline. In return, the agreement boosted Japan’s investment prospects in Turkey and contributed to positive global perceptions of Japanese nuclear technology. Upon its formalisation in 2015, the agreement saw the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a “strategic partnership,” enhancing Japan’s regional credibility as a development partner. The long-term economic benefits of nuclear exports are also uncertain. Japanese firms face significant competition for construction contracts from international competitors, including China, Russia, France and South Korea. While joint ventures with rivals are not uncommon the Sinop project is shared with a French firm some companies fear that extensive collaboration, particularly with Chinese firms, will compromise their competitive edge and damage future prospects. Indeed, the financial integrity of Japanese firms such as Toshiba and its subsidiary Westinghouse are already under scrutiny. Existing agreements may also be cancelled: In November 2016, Vietnam pulled out of a deal with a conglomerate of Japanese firms worth $11 billion due to safety fears and spiralling construction costs. More cancellations would see the vast sums of yen spent on project campaigns struck out as further financial losses. Without a strong domestic demand to fall back on, many companies may find that the balance between financial risks and rewards of overseas nuclear power projects will tip increasingly toward the former.
